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CANADIAN SOCIETY FOR THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF 
MATHEMATICS/ OCIiTi CANADIENNE D'HISTOIRE 
ET DE PHILOSOPHIE DES MATHiMATIQUES 
This department, edited by John L. Berggren, is devoted to 
the CSHPM/SCHPM, which has designated Historia Mathematics as its 
official journal. (See the Editorial on p. 253.) 
HISTORY 
At the 1973 Conference of Learned Societies at Queen’s 
University in Kingston, a meeting of mathematicians, philosophers 
and historians on June 9 decided to found the CSHPM/SCHPM. 
Charles V. Jones was elected chairman pro tern to coordinate pre- 
parations for the new learned society. In conjunction with the 
1974 CLS meeting at the University of Toronto, the CSHPM/SCHPM 
held its founding business meeting, a session for contributed 
papers, and a joint session with its sister society for science 
(CSHPS/SCHPS) . Further sessions were held with the Canadian 
Mathematical Congress on June 7. 
ORGANIZATION 
The constitution, adopted at the founding meeting on June 3, 
stated that “the aim of the Society is to promote throughout 
Canada discussion, research, teaching, and publication in the 
history and the philosophy of mathematics” and that membership is 
open to “any person with interest in the history or in the philo- 
sophy of mathematics .‘I 
The first Executive Council was elected as follows: President, 
Charles V. Jones (York University); Vice-President, Tom W. Settle 
(Guelph University); Secretary-Treasurer, John L. Berggren (Simon 
Fraser University); Council Members, W.S.H. Crawford (Mount 
Allison University), N.T. Gridgeman (National Research Council), 
and Fred Ustina (University of Alberta at Edmonton). 
Annual dues of $4 were set for 1974 and for 1975. Members 
have the option of paying a single fee of $10 for dues and 
subscription to Historia Mathematics, beginning with the calendar 
year 1974 and Volume I of HM. Those interested in joining should 
write to the Secretary-Treasurer, Professor J.L. Berggren, Dept. 
of Mathematics, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British 
Columbia. 
CONTRIBUTED PAPERS AT THE TORONTO MEETING 
The following are author abstracts of papers given at the 
CSHPM/SCHPM session June 3: 
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Tyrone Lai (Memorial University of Newfoundland): Did Newton 
renounce infinitesimals? De Morgan, in an article published in 
1852, advances the thesis that Newton "renounces and abjures" 
the infinitely small quantity in 1704. My paper establishes 
that Newton did not; that infinitesimals formed in fact part of 
the foundation of his method of fluxions; and that, in addition, 
they are elements in his general ontology. Conceptual problems 
regarding infinitesimals were shelved by mathematicians at 
Newton's time for various reasons; Newton relegated these prob- 
lems to a secondary position on metaphysical grounds. 
Stephen Regoczei (University of Toronto): Was pure mathematics 
really discovered by George Boole in 1854? An inquiry into the 
historical origins of the split between pure and applied mathe- 
matics can hardly ignore Russell's 1901 remark, that "Pure 
mathematics was discovered by Boole, in a work which he called 
the Laws of Thought (1854)." In the present paper various des- 
criptions of pure mathematics are examined in addition to what 
Russell considers to be pure mathematics. The claims of Russell's 
1901 paper regarding Boole's achievements are checked against 
the actual writings of Boole published in 1847 and 1854. Certain 
discrepancies are noted. In conclusion, the "discovery theory" 
of the origins of pure mathematics is contrasted with other 
explanations, especially as they relate to the present discontent 
and soul searching within the mathematical communities of Canada 
and other countries. 
Byron E. Wall (University of Toronto): The calculus of 
feeling: F.Y. Edgeworth's quantification of utilitarianism. 
Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian principles were guiding lights to 
nineteenth century thinkers who sought to revitalize the moral 
sciences with a single unifying key. In 1881 F.Y. Edgeworth 
attempted a synthesis with models composed of continuous func- 
tions. He uses Gustave Fechner's just perceivable increment as 
a unit of feeling, and the calculus of variations to obtain 
inequality relations where precise measurement was impractical. 
His treatment of economics concentrates on a study of contract. 
To resolve indeterminate contract, he introduces the utilitarian 
calculus. In a "Euclidean" axiomatic style he derives theorems 
concerning the best distribution of means, labour, and birth rate 
so as to maximize the triple integral over happiness, individuals, 
and time. 
V. Linis (University of Ottawa): Kant and axiomatizations of 
arithmetic. Apart from the frequently refuted and ridiculed 
proposition that arithmetic is "a pure science of time," Kant's 
writings writings contain important analyses of the basic notions 
of arithmetic. It is a purpose of this paper to present in a 
concise manner those notions which were relevant to the subsequent 
developments in the axiomatization of arithmetic in the ninteenth 
century. 
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Gregory H. Moore (University of.Toronto): Can every set be 
well-ordered? A turn-of-the-century controversy leads to axioma- 
tization. This paper considers the problem .of well-ordering 
from Georg Cantor’s original claim in 1883 that any set can be 
well-ordered to Ernst Zermelo’s axiomatization of set theory in 
1908. Many mathematicians rejected Cantor’s proof, which required 
an infinite number of dependent choices. In 1904 Zermelo formu- 
lated the Axiom of Choice in order to provide an alternative 
proof. Through public letters the French mathematicians Baire, 
Borel, and Lebesgue opposed Zermelo’s proof while Hadamard alone 
defended it. The three opponents emphasized that the proof was 
in no sense constructive and that the function used to well-order 
a given set was not well-defined. In 1906 Poincard accepted the 
Axiom of Choice as a legitimate, synthetic a priori postulate 
but rejected Zermelo’s proof for its use of impredicative proce- 
dures. Russell, Peano, and Brouwer objected to the Axiom for a 
variety of reasons. In 1908 Zermelo replied to his critics. He 
stressed the intuitive evidence for the Axiom of Choice as well 
as its utility in proving many results in the theory of cardinal 
numbers and some in analysis. To strengthen his position, 
Zermelo stated the first axiomatization of set theory -- expli- 
citly including the Axiom of Choice. In conclusion the paper 
discusses the evidence which this topic provides on the conjecture 
that axiomatization has arisen a s a way of dealing with contra- 
dictory mathematical results or differing philosophical views. 
Peter K. Schotch (Dalhousie University): A modality and 
contingency problem in the formalization of science. This paper 
deals with an issue connected with the program of the formaliza- 
tion of natural science. Many physicists and mathematicians, 
for example, are now engaged in research directed towards deve- 
loping mechanics as an axiomatic discipline. The usual approach 
to the laws of mechanics is to regard them as not being neces- 
sarily true (but rather contingently true). Certain implications 
of this program are drawn out regarding the impact of this pro- 
gram on the contemporary formal logic of modality. In particular 
it is shown that the above program forces one to reassess the 
position of the modal system s5 usually taken to be one of the 
most intuitively acceptable. 
JOINT SESSION WITH CSHPS/SCHPS 
Reflecting the cooperation of the Socidt6 Canadienne d’Histoire 
et de Philosophie des Sciences (CSHPS/SCHPS) in the organization 
of the CSHPM/SCHPM and the common hopes for a continuing close 
working relationship, a joint session was held on June 4 on “The 
role of mathematics in the history of physical science.” The 
following are author abstracts. 
John L. Berggren (Simon Fraser University) : Archimedes' 
contributions to the development of statics. The purpose of 
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this paper is to assess Archimedes’ role in giving a mathematical 
formulation to the science of statics. The existence of Archi- 
medes ’ work and its derivatives was of great importance for the 
development of a science of mechanics both in the Middle Ages 
and in the Renaissance. But, in addition, his work on statics 
played a fundamental part in the rest of his mathematical endea- 
vours -- both as a source of problems and in providing a method 
of discovering difficult mathematical theorems. Certainly from 
a logical standpoint (and internal evidence suggests from a 
chronological standpoint as well) all of his subsequent work 
rests, either directly (for its proof) or indirectly (for its 
discovery), on some of the theorems proved in Book I of On the 
Equilibrium of Plane Figures. This paper therefore concentrates 
on that work. Previous students of Archimedes’ work (Heiberg, 
*Heath, Dijksterhuis, Mugler, et al.) have accepted the proposi- 
tions of this book as emanating from Archimedes -- though some 
have remarked it seems to be a fragment of a larger work. We 
shall argue that, on the contrary, at least five and perhaps 
seven of the fifteen propositions in the text are not Archimidean. 
The extremely loose logical structure of the work, the trivial 
nature of some of its propositions, and an error in the proof of 
a major proposition all argue against it being an authentic 
piece of Archimedes’ work. We shall compare it in some detail 
with the work On the Sphere and the Cylinder (Book I) in order 
to see more clearly the differences between the work under consi- 
deration and a real piece of Archimedes’ mathematics. It will 
appear from the discussion that what we have is rather an instruc- 
tional text in mathematical statics which derives only in part 
(much the best part, however) from Archimedes’ work on the 
subject. 
Stillman Drake (University of Toronto): Continuity and 
discreteness in early theories of free fall. Aristotle in his 
Physics defined “continuous ,‘I “contiguous ,‘I and “successive” 
quite clearly. The modern concept.of the continuum hinges on 
Euclid Book V, but Euclid did not there use the word “continuous.” 
Arabic alterations of Book V introduced the idea of continued 
proportionality, used by Medieval scholars in mathematicizing 
continua. Until the mid-sixteenth century, the theory of propor- 
tion was essentially based on Euclid Books VII and VIII, and was 
arithmetical in character. A quantum aspect was thus introduced 
into mathematical physics, particularly with regard to speeds in 
free fall. This has been neglected by historians of impetus 
theory and its account of acceleration. New Latin and Italian 
translations of Euclid in the sixteenth century restored the 
Eudoxian theory of Book V, making possible the rigorous treatment 
of ratios of continuous magnitudes. This was followed by Galileo’s 
discovery of the law of free fall and its derivation by the use 
of one-to-one correspondence between infinite aggregates. The 
beginnings of the calculus at the hands of Cavalieri and his 
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method of indivisibles ensued. Conservative physicists of the 
seventeenth century offered a means of reconciling Galileo’s 
analysis with the quantum picture of the Medieval mathematical 
physicists. Although their programme was forgotten, it enables 
us to reconstruct Medieval physical thought on the one hand, and 
on the other to understand the disturbance caused in the early 
twentieth century by the reappearance of quantum conceptions in 
motion. 
H.S.M. Coxeter (University of Toronto): The space-time 
continuum. Among the pure mathematicians who contributed to the 
rise of physical science, this paper mentions G. Desargues and 
J.V. Poncelet, who created projective space by adding ideal 
elements to Euclidean space; also A. Cayley and F. Klein, who 
used a polarity to equip this projective space with a non- 
Euclidean metric; G.F.B. Riemann and L. Schlsfli who first under- 
stood that an n-dimensional continuum can be of finite extent 
without having a boundary (not only when n = 1 or 2 but also for 
greater values); E. Study, who boldly stepped outside Klein’s 
absolute quadric to discover the exterior-hyperbolic space which 
P. Du Val (17 years later) identified with W. de Sitter’s world, 
thus providing a convincing explanation for the observed depar- 
ture of the most remote objects in the universe. It mentions 
also W.K. Clifford, one of whose “geometric algebras” has 32 
units which are now seen to be isomorphic to P.A.M. Dirac’s 32 
matrices. Most particularly it mentions H. Minkowski, who en- 
riched affine space by inserting a real isotropic cone at every 
point, and invented the world line (which was so fruitfully 
developed by A.A. Robb and J.L. Synge). Minkowski might well 
have anticipated the theory of relativity if his brilliant 
career had not been cut short by untreated appendicitis. 
HISTORY AT THE CANADIAN MATHEMATICAL CONGRESS/SOCIETE MATHEMATIQUE 
DE CANADA 
At the annual meeting of the CMC/SMC on June 6-8, 1974 at 
Universit6 Lava1 there were five presentations on history of 
mathematics. The Jeffery-Williams Lecture, given by Hans Zassen- 
haus (Ohio State University), featured quotations from Minkowski’s 
letters to Hilbert, accompanied by explanations and commentary. 
An invited address by E.A. Barbeau (University of Toronto), 
entitled “The leap to infinity -- series summing,” dealt with 
Euler’s ideas and techniques relating to divergent series. 
The following are author abstracts of papers given at a 
CSHPM/SCHPM session on 7 June. 
Wei-Ching Chang (University of Toronto): Variants of the 
chi-square test: Tbiele's conditional binomial test and Bowley's 
chi-dash-square. As a foe of the Bayesian method of inference, 
the Danish astronomer T.N. Thiele (1872) proposed a direct method 
of the conditional binomial test to judge the goodness of fit of 
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a mortality table graduation. His techniques of linearization 
and orthogonal transformations anticipated later works of J. 
Neyman (1949) and J.O. Irwin (1949). It turns out that this test 
is a special case of K. Pearson’s (1900) chi-square test. Pear- 
son’s test was employed in the English economic statistician 
A.L. Bowley’s (1926) famous work on the sampling theory. By 
postulating the continuity of the a priori distribution, Bowley 
obtained the chi-dash-square test -- the Bayesian counterpart of 
the chi-square test. His work, therefore, foreshadowed those 
of Neyman (1929), H. Jeffreys (1938) and D.V. Lindley (1965). 
Kenneth 0. May (University of Toronto): Logical fetishism 
and mathematical policy. In a number of respects the dominant 
ideology of mathematicians is in conflict with reality, especially 
with the historical development of mathematics and with the 
requirements of a mathematical policy that would support a 
healthy growth of the discipline. This paper argues that the 
root difficulty is logical fetishism -- the “blind reverence” 
for logic and the gross exaggeration of the significance of its 
use in mathematics. 
Gregory H. Moore (University of Toronto): An historical 
prespective on the axiomatization of set theory. What gave rise 
to E. Zermelo’s axiomatization of set theory in 1908? The 
standard response is that the set-theoretic paradoxes -- such as 
Russell’s paradox and the Burali-Forti paradox -- were responsible. 
However, a careful analysis of Zermelo’s papers suggests an 
alternative explanation. Using a new postulate, which he later 
named the Axiom of Choice, Zermelo proved in 1904 that any set 
can be well-ordered. Quickly his proof provoked an intense con- 
troversy involving mathematicians in France (R. Baire, E. Borel, 
J. Hadamard, H. Lebesgue, H. PoincarB), Germany (F. Bernstein, 
A. Schoenflies), England (P. Jourdain, B. Russell), and Italy 
(G. Peano). In 1908 Zermelo published two lengthy and closely 
related papers on set theory. In the first he gave a second 
proof of the well-ordering theorem, again by means of the Axiom 
of Choice. But he devoted most of that paper to an energetic 
refutation of those who had attacked either his earlier proof or 
the Axiom. He carefully phrased the new proof to fit into the 
axiomatization appearing in his second paper. The evidence 
indicates that the motivation for Zermelo’s axiomatization was 
twofold : (1) to provide a secure base for his Axiom of Choice 
by embedding it in an axiom system for set theory, and (2) to 
provide an adequate foundation for both Cantor’s set theory and 
all of mathematics. In these two papers Zermelo devoted little 
attention to the paradoxes. When he did use them, it was 
primarily to fault his opponents such as Peano. For Zermelo the 
paradoxes were only an obstacle to remove with as little fuss as 
possible -- in contrast to Russell for whom they were a preoc- 
cupat ion. 
